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RECENT DECISIONS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE NEW YORK SALES IN BULK ACT.
-Section 44 of the P. P. L., as amended by Chapter 507, Laws
1914, provides that, in case of a sale, transfer or assignment in bulk
of part or all of one's merchandise other than in the ordinary course
of business, an inventory be taken, that the cost of the goods to
the Seller be listed and that notice to every creditor of the Seller
be given by the Purchaser at least five days prior to the sale. Un-
less these conditions are complied with, the transfer is void with
respect to creditors, and the Purchaser is accountable to them.
In Klein vs. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, this statute was de-
clared constitutional. The importance of this decision becomes
manifest when we consider the uncertainty caused by the passage
of a law similar to one which had been declared unconstitutional
but a few years before (Wright vs. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330).
This case overrules Wright vs. Hart which held that the Sales
in Bulk Act violated the Federal Constitution in that it discrimin-
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ated against Merchants and that it was repugnant to the State and
Federal Constitutions in imposing arbitrary restrictions on the
liberty of contracts.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Vann J. maintained that a
"statute which is uniform in its effect upon all persons to whom it
applies is not invalid because it applies to a limited number."
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Missouri vs. Lewis, 101 U. S.
22.) While classifications of persons and businesses for pur-
poses of regulation is not prohibited by the requirement of equal
protection of the law (14th Amendment to Federal Constitution)
these classifications must in every case be reasonable ones. (Gulf
R'y Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150.) A reasonable regulation to pre-
vent fraud is a valid exercise of police power. "A reasonable
regulation to protect the rights of all does not depiive one of his
property simply because it interferes with the use thereof to the
extent necessary to protect the public from fraudulent practise"
(dictum) People vs. Luhr, 195 N. Y. 377.
Since Wright vs. Hart the validity of like statutes in Connecticut
and Michigan has been upheld in Lemieux vs. Yound, 211 U. S.
489, and in Kidd, Dater & Price Co. vs. Musselman Grocery Co.,
217 U. S. 461. The Michigan law is similar in every respect to
that of New York. It is to be noted that in every State in the
Union, with the exception of Utah, Sales in Bulk Acts have been
passed upon favorably by the Courts.
CRIMINAL LAW-INDICTMENT-MURDER, FIRsT DEGREE.-
Death resulting in commission of Felony:
Defendant while operating an automobile, ran down and killed
a man. He, was chauffeur to the owner of the automobile and
was using it without permission, despite previous instructions to
the contrary. He was indicted for Murder in the First Degree
for the killing of a human being while in the commission of a
felony. The case proceeded to trial, when defendant pleaded
guilty to the Crime of Manslaughter in the Second Degree.
Penal Law, Sec. 1044, subd. 2, 2nd clause: "The killing of a
human being is murder in the first degree when committed 'with-
out a design to affect death by a person engaged in the commission
of or in anattempt to commit a felony either upon or affecting
the person killed, or otherwise.'"
The felony in this case was the larceny of the car under Penal
Law § 1293-a: "Any chauffeur or other person who without the
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consent of the owner shall take, use or operate * * * an auto-
mobile or motor vehicle, and operate or drive or cause the same
to be operated or driven for his own profit, use or purpose, steals
the same and is guilty of larceny and shall be punished accord-
ingly."
In order to indict for first degree murder under the section
first quoted it is necessary that the homicide take place while
the felony is being actually attempted or committed. (People v.
Lingley, 207 N. Y. 396; Peo. v. Schermerhorn, 203 N. Y. 57;
Peo. v. Patini, 208 N. Y. 176; Peo. v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134.)
"The elements constituting the felony must be distinct from
the homicide and not be an ingredient of the homicide and indict-
able therewith and convictable thereunder." (People v. Jacob
Huter, 184 N. Y. 237.)
The above section on larceny is a radical departure from the
common law theory, and makes the larceny of the car under these
conditions a continuing crime. Under the common law theory
the larceny was complete after there was a complete asportation.
"If thief has absolute control of thing for an instant larceny is
complete". Bishop's New Crim. Law, Vol. II, § 795, subd. 1;
"Lifting bag from its place on coach box and endeavoring to pull
it out, but being prevented by guard". Held larceny. (Walsh's
Case, Moody's Crown Cases, 14.) "Ear-ring torn from woman's
ear and later found caught in the hair". Held larceny. Lapier's
Case, 1 Leach Crown Cases, 320.) "Lifting pocketbook from coat
pocket about three inches". Held sufficient asportavit. (Harrison
v. Peo., 40 N. Y. 518.) "Lifting pocketbook from pocket is a taking
and carrying away". (State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779.)
It would seem under above the sections that a homicide com-
mitted by a thief operating the car at -any time after the theft
of the car is sufficient to increase the gravamen of the offense
from manslaughter to murder.
GUARANTY-CONSTRUCTION-INTENTION OF PARTIES. The de-
fendants' intestate procured from the plaintiff a loan to a corpora-
tion in which he was a stockholder, upon its promissory note, and
also a loan to an individual on his promissory note. In order to
secure the repayment of the loans the defendants' intestate executed
his certain contract wherein among other things he agreed to
guarantee "the full, prompt and ultimate payment of the said
notes". Subsequently defendants' intestate died and the notes after
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several renewals finally became due and were unpaid. This action
was then brought against the defendants as executrix and executor
to recover upon the guaranty, which was in the following form:
"Now, therefore, I hereby covenant and agree with said
bank to guarantee, and I do hereby guarantee the full,
prompt, and ultimate payment of all of said notes, aggre-
gating twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) and of any and
all renewals thereof or of either of them when the same
shall become due and payable, until all of the said loans and
notes and any and all renewals thereof are fully paid and
discharged."
Held, that upon examination of the agreement the word
"ultimate" was used to cover notes ultimately given in whole or
in part in renewal of the notes given at the time of the guaranty
and thus to clearly continue the obligation of guaranty, so long
as the loans were extended. It further appears from the contract
that the parties intended an unconditional guaranty and this inten-
tion must control. (First National Bank of Litchfield, Conn. vs.
Jones et al., 219 N. Y. 312.)
The agreement is ali unconditional guaranty of payment of
the notes in question, and as such the plaintiff's right of action
was complete when the makers thereof failed to pay. (Stein vs.
Whitman, 209 N. Y. 576.) The meaning of the guaranty depended
upon the intention of the parties. (Hamilton vs. Van Rensselaer,
43 N. Y. 244; Melick vs. Knox, 44 N. Y. 676; Catskill National
Bank vs. Dumnary, 206 N. Y. 550.) On this question the Federal
Court in the case of Glaser, Kohn & Co, vs. U. S., 224 Fed. 84
said: "A guaranty should receive a liberal, fair and reasonable
interpretation and attain the object designed." ' In the case of
Delaware County National Bank vs. King, 47 Misc. 447, the Court
laid particular stress upon the intention of the parties governing
in cases of guaranty and there said, "The obligation of guarantor
.is neither enlarged or diminished by giving to the language a
strained meaning, but in each instance the instrument is to be given
effect according to the apparent intention and understanding of
the parties as obtained from its context."
The intention in the case under discussion was based upon
what in point of fact was meant by the words "ultimate" and "full
and prompt payment;" the Court finally concluding that they
could have no other meaning than that the obligor should continue
beyond to the end of all substitutions, renewals and extensions.
In National Exchange Bank vs. Gay (57 Conn. 224, 17 Atl. 555),
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which was an action upon a similar contract of guaranty, that
Court reached the same conclusion and upon the same reasoning.
However, in the case of Home Savings Bank of Fremont vs.
Shallenberger (146 N. W. 993), the Court said that a guaranty
of payment of a note is an absolute contract-that the sum
expressed in the note should be paid at the maturity thereof at all
events.
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the authorities,
this case is in accord with the general opinion on the subject of
the guaranty of a note and substantiates the doctrine.
CORPORATIONS-PRACTICE OF LAW BY CORPORATION-CERTI-
ORARI-NEw YORK TAX LAW.-In People ex rel. Floersheimer
v. Purdy, 174 App. Div. 694, and People ex rel. Trojan Realty
Corporation v. Purdy, 174 App. Div. 702, substantially the same
state of facts were presented. The owner of real property. situated
in the City of New York, in the first case, an individual; in the
second case a corporation, retained an attorney to obtain .a reduc-
tion of tax assessments. In each case the attorney employed a
corporation organized for such purposes to procure the desired
reduction. Upon its failure in this respect before the Board of
Tax Commissioners the corporation, through the same attorney,
instituted certiorari proceedings to review the decision of the Tax
Board. In one case the attorney's fee was to be paid out of the
contingent fee of the corporation, if successful; in the other case,
although in reality the same procedure was to be followed, there
was a formal retainer signed by the relator before the beginning of
the proceeding, but after the attorney had employed the corporation.
Held-That this was an illegal practice of law by a corporation
and that a corporation was not authorized under Section 37 of
the Tax Law to apply for a reduction of taxes.
Under Section 280 of the Penal Law: "It shall be unlawful
for any corporation or voluntary association to practice or appear
as an attorney at law, for any person other than itself in any
court in this State or before any judicial body, or to make it a
business to practice as an attorney at law, for any person other
than itself, in any of said courts or to hold itself out to the
public as being entitled to practice law, or render or furnish legal
services or advice, or to furnish attorneys or counsel or to render
legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings." There can
be little doubt that the corporation was contravening the above
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statute in engaging the attorney to bring certiorari proceedings,
even though brought in the name of the relator. (Matter of
Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 483.)
The holding of the Appellate Division that the Tax Commis-
sion is a judicial body and therefore the appearance of the corpo-
ration before it was an illegal practice of law does not seem to
be borne out by the authorities, nor does the majority opinion of
the court cite any in support of its position.
The Tax Commission is not a judicial body: (Matter of Town
of Hempstead, 32 App. Div. 6; Matter of McMahon v. Palmer,
102 N. Y. 176; People ex rel. Kendall v. Feitner, 51 App. 201;
Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201) ; even though the action of the
Tax Commission is made by statute (Tax Law, Secs. 37, 290)
subject to jidicial review.
Although the evident desire of the courts to curb the illegal
practice of law is a laudable one, yet it would seem that the
Appellate Division in the present instance had permitted the wish
to be father to the thought. The-dictum in the prevailing opinion
(p. 708) that a corporation which had no prior relation to or
knowledge of the property assessed cannot in the nature of things
be thus qualified to apply for correction of assessments under the
Tax Law, Sec. 37, seems clearly wrong. The dissenting opinion
holding that a corporation may apply on the same footing as an
individual appears to be more in accordance with logic and the
decided law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - LIQUOR
TRAFFIC-WEBB-KENYON LAw.-West Virginia by statute forbade
all advertisement, sale, purchase or shipment of liquor for per-
sonal use or otherwise, and obtained an injunction restraining
defendants (common carriers) from transporting liquor from
Maryland into the State. Plaintiff brought present actions to
compel carriers to take a shipment of liquor ordered for personal
use to be delivered in West Virginia. Held, by the Webb-Kenyon
law, a party cannot under the protection of the commerce clause
of the Constitution transport liquor into a State for any purpose
in violation of the law of that State. (The James Clark Distilling
Co. v. The Western Maryland R. R. Co. and the State of W. Va.;
Same v. The American Express Co. and the State of W. Va., 37
Supreme Court Reporter, 180.)
Up to the enactment 4f the Webb-Kenyon law (Act of Congress
of Mar. 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 699), the law is well settled. Congress
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has the power to regulate commerce among the States. (U. S.
Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.) In the case of liquor traffic this power
is exclusive. (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.) And in the absence
of Congressional regulation commerce is free. (Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U. S. 100; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 id. 161.) A legitimate
article is a subject of interstate commerce as long as it remains in
the original package or until it has left the hands of the importer
and a state cannot interfere before that time. (Leisy v. Hardin,
supra; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; AAnerican Steel &
Wire Co. v. Speed, 192.U. S. 500.)
The Wilson law (26 Stat. 313, 1890) forbids the sale of liquor
in the original package when such sale is in violation of the State
law. (In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Cren-
shaw, 198 id. 17.) B1ut this does not prevent importation by
the consignee. (Rhodes v. Jawa, 170 U. S. 412; Vance v. Vander-
cook, 170 id. 438; Amer. Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 id. 133; Rossi
v. Penn., 238 id. 62, 66; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co.,
241 id. 48, 51.)
Lower courts have held that the Webb-Kenyon law does not
prevent shipment of intoxicating liquor for personal use though
contrary to the State law. (Hamm Brewing Co. v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. Co., 215 Fed. 672; Van Winkle v. State, 27 Delaware,
578.)
On the other hand the power given to Congress by the Con-
stitution is direct, without limitation and far reaching, and it
would seem that the permission or ratification of State legislation
as in the principal case is within this power. (Leisy v. Hardin,
supra; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321; Hoke v. U. S. 227 U. S. 308;
Willoughby on the Constitution, pp. 680-683.)
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the spirit
of the cases sustaining the Wilson law, and is undoubtedly a
sound and practical application of congressional control of inter-
state commerce with a view to giving effect to the large mass of
State legislation which has heretofore been fruitless because of
the subterfuges protected by the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution.
WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATIoN.-Plaintiff sued for damages
under Sections 1902-1905 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claimed
to have been sustained by reason of the death of the intestate;
defendants interposed in their answer the provisions of the Work-
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men's Compensation Law as a bar to such action; plaintiff
demurred to this defense, as insufficient, and the demurrer was
sustained. (Shanahan vs. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 New
York, 469.)
Previous to the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Law,
there existed statutory provisions as to actions for damages for
death resulting through employers' negligence which could be
brought by the next of kin of the decedent. The words "next of
kin" were defined in these statutory provisions (Secs. 1902-1905
C. C. P.) so as to include the wife, children, parents, brothers
and sisters, nephews.and nieces of the deceased, and this right of
action was protected by the State Constitution, Section .18 of
Article 1.
The Workmen's Compensation Law of 1910 was held uncon-
stitutional (Ives vs. South Buffalo Railway Co., 201 N. Y. 271)
on the ground that it took property without due process of law,
since it imposed liability upon employers without fault.
In 1913, the State Constitution was amende'd, giving the State
Legislature full power to enact Workmen's Compensation Laws,
and containing provisions that "nothing contained in this Constitu-
tion shall be construed to limit the power of the legislature to
enact laws for the protection of the lives, health or safety of
employees; . . . or to provide that the right of such com-
pensation, and the remedy therefor, shall be exclusive "of all other
rights and remedies for injuries to employees or for death resulting
from such injuries."
In 1914 a new Workmen's Compensation Law was passed.
(Laws 1914, ch. 41.) It provides (Section 10) that "every
employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall pay
compensation . . . for disability or death of his em-
ployee arising out of and in the course of his employment, without
regard to fault as a cause of such injury," except where such
injury is occasioned by wilful intent of the injured employee or
results solely from his intoxication while on duty. Section 11
provides that "the liability prescribed. shall be exclusive," except-
ing cases wherein the employer has failed to follow out the pro-
visions of Section 50, as to securing the payment of compensation,
when the injured person or his executor or administrator may elect
to sue for damages or claim compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Law.
The plaintiffs in the principal case sued in behalf of adult
brothers and sisters of the deceased. The Workmen's Compensa-
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tion Law excludes adult brothers and sisters from its provisions,
allowing compensation only to brothers and sisters under the age
of eighteen and. who are dependents. Plaintiffs consequently
sought to sustain their action for damages under 1902-1905 of
the Code, under the provisions of which they would come within
the meaning of the words "next of kin." The Court of Appeals
properly held the remedy in such cases to be exclusively under
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
The constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Law hfas
been upheld by the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the criticism
which has been directed to it as a violation of the "due process
of law" section of the Federal Constitution. The true basis for
its constitutionality was stated in Matter of Jensen vs. Southern
Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514, which justifies the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law as a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. The Court in that case demonstrates that this Law pro-
tects both employer and employee; it protects both employee and
employer from the expenses and delays and uncertainties of liti-
gation; it protects the employer from the often unjust and ex-
travagant verdicts for damages possible under the Code provisions,
and it protects the employee from the certainty of defeat if unable
to establish a case of actionable negligence. The intention of the
Legislature in passing the Workmen's Compensation Law is stated
in Matter of Post vs. Burger and Zohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, at p. 552.
The interpretation of the law by the Court in the principal case,
seems but to be carrying out the obvious intent of the Legislature.
Whatever may be said for the advantages of such a law as provid-
ing a workable, and in the main, a just and equitable system for
assessing damages, it is evident that a law which imposes liability
for accidents upon a person or class of persons, irrespective of
their negligence, can be justified only by resorting to the police
powers of the State. The ultimate burden of expense for these
losses are thrown upon the consumer, so that in the end the em-
ployer does not suffer. All this seems to tend towards State
paternalism. The State has and should have a certain latitude in
the supervision of the affairs of its citizens; how far such super-
vision should be extended, is a question.
CORPORATIONS - CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE - DEFENSE OF
UiTRA Vis.V-Where defendant, a corporation chartered to
manufacture and sell beer, entered into a contract with- plaintiff,
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
another corporation, whereby it guaranteed the payment of all
bills rendered by plaintiff to the Bond Development Co. for serv-
ices rendered to said Bond Depelopment Co. in towing away certain
earth and garbage, held, the defense of Ultra Vires should be
sustained. (G. F. Harms Co. v. Leonard Michel Brewing Com-
pany, 162 N. Y. Supp. 1071. Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, January 1917, opinion per Scott, J.)
English authorities have treated Ultra Vires contracts as
absolutely null, and wholly void upon the broad ground that a
corporation cannot act, as such, beyond the limits of its corporate
powers. (East Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 11
Common bench, 775; Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations,
275; Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7
House of Lords, 653; Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations,
278; Corbett vs. Southeastern, etc., R. Cos., Managing Committee,
L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 12; Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations,
283.) The United States Supreme Court has entertained a similar
view, because of notice to contractors of the provisions of Cor-
porate Charters and limitations thereon, protection of stockholders'
rights, and the interests of the public in that a corporation shall
not act beyond the limits of its corporate powers. (Central
Transportation Co. vs. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24;
Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporation, 295; Penn Co. v. St. L.,
Alton, etc., R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290.)
In New York and. generally it has been held that where the
contract remains wholly executory either party may disaffirm and
no recovery may be had thereupon by the adverse party where
Ultra Vires is pleaded. (Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 1-15;
Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations, 286; Jemison v. Citizens
Savings Bank, 122 N. Y. 140.) Kansas is strongly contrary, how-
ever. (Pape v. Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440; Harris v. Independent
Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750, Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations,
337.)
Where the plea of Ultra Vires, if allowed, would work legal
wrong it will not be tolerated. (Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63
N. Y. 62; Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations, 310; Rider
Life Raft Co. v. Roach, 97 N. Y. 378; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.
Y. 519; H. Remington & Sons, P. & P. Co. v. Caswell, 126 N. Y.
142.) Accordingly, where a contract has in good faith been
executed on one side and the corporation has had the actual bene-
fit of performance, it has been settled that the defense of Ultra
Vires cannot be sustained.. (Bissell v. N. S. & N. I. R. R. Co.,
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22 N. Y. 58; Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, supra; Linkhauf v.
Lombard, 137 N. Y. 417; Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y.
24; Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations, 314; Usher v. N. Y.
C. & H. R. R. Co., 76 A. D. 422; Aff'd. 179 N. Y. 544.)
It would seem that this rule is founded by the New York
Courts, upon the general principle of estoppel: (Vought v. Eastern
Building Loan Association, 172 N. Y. 508). The corporation
under such circumstances should not be heard to say that its acts
were beyond its powers, but since it is admitted that any persbn
dealing with a corporation is charged with notice of the extent of
its corporate powers and the limitations thereon as set forth in its
charter, (East Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R. Co., supra;
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullmans Palace Car Co., supra;
lemison v. Citizens Savings Bank, supra; Alexander v. Cauldwell,
83 N. Y. 480), it is submitted as a sounder view that a corpora-
tion must for equitable reasons and on grounds of public policy
satisfy the plaintiff where it has received the actual benefit of a
bona fide performance. The Kansas Courts hold similarly
(Pape v. Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440; Harris vs. Independence Gas
Co., 76 Kan. 750; Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations, 337.)
(See also discussion Clark on Corporations, 3d Ed. by Wormser,
pp. 234 and 235.)
As a general rule a corporation is not permitted to enter upon
contracts of guaranty unless expressly so empowered by its charter.
It has been consistently held that the power to lend money or credit
cannot be fairly or reasonably implied from the ordinary charters
of commercial and manufacturing corporations. (10 Cyc. 1109;
Kellogg-Mackay Co. v. Havre Hotel Co., 199 Fed. 727.) For
added reasons of public policy banking corporations and institu-
tions of a fiduciary character are not thus permitted to scatter
their credit among enterprises beyond the fair contemplation of
their charters. (Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 13 N. Y. 309;
National Bank v. Wells, 79 N. Y. 498; National Park Bank v.
German-American Mutual W. & S. Co., 116 N. Y. 281; Gause v.
Commonwealth Trust Co., 196 N. Y. 154.) Where corporations
of a purely commercial character are concerned, however, there is
no public policy which prohibits even an accommodation endorse-
ment of commercial paper by such a corporation, consequently,
if such endorsement is made with the knowledge and consent of
all the stockholders, and creditors' rights are not affected, such en-
dorsement is valid and enforceable. (Martin v. Niagara, etc., Co.,
122 N. Y. 165.)
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Moreover, it is well settled that where the contract of
guarantee was made in the furtherance of the corporation's
immediate business ventures, even though unattended by direct
pecuniary benefit to the corporation, it is enforceable;
the acts in such cases are really Intra Vires. (Holm v. Claus
Lipsius Brewing Co., 21 N. Y. 204; Koehler v. Reinheimer Co.,
26 N. Y. 1; Holmes etc., Co. v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75; Bacon v.
Montauk Brewing Co., 130 N. Y. 737; Hess vs. Sloane, 66 App.
Div. 522; aff'd. 173 N. Y. 616; Kellogg-Mackay Co. v. Havre Hotel
Co., 199 Fed. 727.)
A more involved question is found in a discussion of what is
meant by "benefit to the corporation" as applied to contracts
partially executed. It has been held that it is unnecessary for the
corporation to receive the actual fruits of the plaintiff's perform-
ance ;-that it is sufficient under the law of contracts if the prom-
isee has acted in good faith, to his detriment. (Kannenberg v.
Evangelical Creed Congregation, 146 Wis. 610.) But §ee contra,
(Marshalltown Stone Co. vs. Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co., 149
Iowa, 141; Visalia Gas & Electric Light Co. vs. Simms, 104 Cal.
326.) It would seem that the New York Courts rely more on
principles of equity and implied contract than on the strict rule
of contract law, and make the receipt of actual benefits by the cor-
poration under the contract the basis of recovery, rather than the
rendition by the plaintiff of abstract legal consideration. (Whitney
Arms Co. v. Barlow, supra; Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, supra;
Appleton v. Citizens Central National Bank. 190 N. Y. 417, Can-
field and Wormser Cas. Corporations, 169.) Even the United
States Supreme Court in the face of its rigid rulings forbidding a
recovery on executory Ultra Vires contracts, recognizes the force
of the equitable doctrine of implied contract as prohibiting the
unjust enrichment of a corporation under the cloak of the plea
of Ultra Vires. (Citizens Central National Bank v. Appleton, 216
U. S. 196, Canfield and Wormser Cas. Corporations, 169.) Where
public policy demanded it New York courts have practically nega-
tived the effect of contract law in these matters. (National Park
Bank v. German-American Mutual W. & S. Co., supra; Gause v.
Commonwealth Trust Co., supra.)
The decision in the principal case is sound. It must be borne
in mind that both of. the parties to the action were corporations.
The plaintiff, therefore, ,was clearly chargeable with a knowledge
of corporate methods and business procedure, over and above the
constructive notice which is legally imputed to it.
